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InTroDucTIon
Conventional electricity generation is by far the largest source of air pollutants that harm human health and con-tribute to global warming. For instance, emissions from 
just nine conventional power plants in Illinois directly contrib-
uted to 300 premature deaths, 14,000 asthma attacks, and more 
than 400 thousand daily incidents of upper respiratory symptoms 
per year among the 33 million people living within 250 miles of 
the plants.1 Moreover, fossil-fueled power plants in the United 
States emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (“CO
2
”) 
in 2003, more than ten times the amount of CO
2
 compared to the 
next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.2 Of all American 
industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—
the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for 
global warming. 
For these and other sobering reasons, many state govern-
ments promote renewable energy technologies though policies 
such as renewable portfolio 
standards (“RPS”) and fees such 
as a systems benefit charges 
(“SBCs”). By these mecha-
nisms, state regulators intend to 
correct three major failures of 
the existing “free” market for 
electricity fuels. First, electricity 
prices do not reflect the social 
costs of generating power. Hid-
den costs, or negative externali-
ties such as the need to secure 
foreign imports of fuel, environmental damage from resource 
extraction, air and water emissions, medical expenses associated 
with air pollution, and the risk of climate change, are not typi-
cally reflected in the rates Americans pay for electricity. 
Second, energy subsidies create an unfair market advantage 
for conventional energy technologies. A majority of the federal 
budget for energy research and development over the past fifty 
years has gone to conventional fossil fuel and nuclear industries 
and not toward renewable energy technologies. From 1948 to 
1998, for instance, roughly eighty percent of U.S. Department of 
Energy appropriations for research and development (“R&D”) 
have gone to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.3 Even though 
coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy industries are relatively 
mature sectors, federal R&D expenditures continue to favor 
these industries. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006, for example, the 
federal government allotted $580 million in R&D funds to fossil 
fuels and $221 million to the nuclear industry. The wind indus-
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try, in contrast, received only $38.3 million.4 
Third, renewable energy generation is subject to a free 
rider problem. Since everyone benefits from the environmental 
advantages of renewable energy, private companies that invest 
millions of dollars in researching and developing clean energy 
technologies are often unable to recover the full profit of their 
investments. Inevitably, the market allows some consumers to 
be free riders, benefiting from the investments of others without 
paying for them. 
sTaTe GovernmenT mechanIsms For  
promoTInG renewable enerGy
State policy interventions intend to stimulate a market for 
renewable resources and spur additional research, development, 
and implementation of renewable energy technologies. So far, 
state governments in the United States have relied predomi-
nately on RPSs and SBCs to level the playing field by neutral-
izing a legacy of unequal federal subsidies and directly requiring 
renewable energy. While state 
policies are innovative and well 
intentioned, the time has come 
to shift to federal regulation and 
intervention. Continued reliance 
on state-based activity alone will 
ironically promote more market 
externalities and “free riding” 
than harmonized federal action.
SyStem benefit charGeS
Systems benefit charges 
(also called public benefit funds, 
system benefit funds, and clean energy funds) originated in the 
1990s at a time when state policy makers were considering elec-
tric utility restructuring legislation. Afraid that gains made in 
pursuing research, development, and implementation of envi-
ronmentally-preferable renewable energy technologies would 
end after markets were deregulated, advocates of the novel 
Energy subsidies create an 
unfair market advantage 
for conventional energy 
technologies.
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technologies won concessions in some states for a new funding 
mechanism for high-risk or long-term projects. A SBC places a 
small tax on every kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity gener-
ated and utilizes those funds to pursue socially-beneficial energy 
projects.5 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that 
SBCs have been responsible for promoting 1,117 megawatts 
(“MW”) of renewable energy capacity.6
SBCs were first implemented in Washington State in 1994 
and were endorsed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion in 1995 as a way to fund services that had previously been 
included in customers’ bills from regulated utility companies.7 As 
part of the negotiations for California’s restructuring law, envi-
ronmental advocates won a provision for a public benefit fund 
that would expend at least $872 million on energy-efficiency 
work from 1998 to the end of 2001 and would allocate $540 
million on renewable energy projects.8 To develop renewable 
energy technologies and other programs expected to struggle 
after deregulation, the California Energy Commission created its 
Public Interest Energy Research program, which initially drew 
about $62 million annually from the state’s SBC.9
By 2006, fifteen states created SBCs. The seventeen orga-
nizations that administer the funds, which are scheduled to total 
$4 billion by 2017, collaborate through a nonprofit organization 
called the Clean Energy States Alliance. The organization spon-
sors original research, collects information and analyses, and 
seeks to expand the use of clean energy technologies with a spe-
cial emphasis on solar, wind, and fuel cells. Moreover, the group 
seeks to increase the efficiency of state research by eliminating 
duplication of efforts and by providing forums for the states to 
share knowledge and insights.10 
renewable portfolio StanDarDS
An RPS is a legislative mandate requiring electricity sup-
pliers (often referred to as “load serving entities”) in a given 
geographical area to employ renewable resources to produce a 
certain percentage of power by a fixed date.
An RPS program transfers the risk of renewable energy 
investments from regulators to investors.11 RPS uses the mar-
ket as a mechanism to determine the efficacy of any given tech-
nology; as a result, higher costs, if they occur, are distributed 
evenly throughout society to those that benefit from them, and 
are blended with the lower costs of existing conventional gen-
eration. 12
Unlike instruments developed by public utility commissions 
with long and complex procedures, often followed by litigation, 
RPSs are bureaucratically simple.13 RPSs enable customers to 
pay producers directly for renewable energy, obviating the need 
for the administration of funds by government agencies. And, 
unlike a one-time award for funds, no project is guaranteed a 
place in the market.14 
First implemented by Iowa and Minnesota in the 1980s, 
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have already 
passed RPS laws requiring utilities to use renewable resources 
as a portion of their overall provision of electricity.15 Four other 
states have nonbinding renewable energy goals.16 Five more 
states—Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Utah—are 
considering mandating some form of RPS. Of the approximate 
9,000 MW of wind energy in the United States, roughly fifty 
percent, or 4,500 MW, have been promoted directly by RPS pol-
icies, whereas ten percent, or 900 MW, have been promoted by 
SBCs from 2001 to 2006.17
FIGure 1: annual u.s. wInD enerGy DevelopmenT by sTaTe 
polIcy mechanIsm, 2001 To 2006
The case For FeDeral InTervenTIon
There are three reasons, however, why continued reliance 
on state-based efforts such as SBCs and RPSs will be insuffi-
cient to promote renewable energy technologies in the United 
States on the scale needed to fight climate change.
improvinG reliability
First, federal intervention is needed to improve electric-
ity reliability. Contrary to what some opponents of renewable 
energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes 
easier to manage the more they are deployed. Electrical and 
power systems engineers have long held the principle that the 
larger a system becomes, the less reserve capacity it needs. 
Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated 
by grid interconnection in exactly this manner. When a single 
electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electric-
ity than the system allocated for each consumer, the strain on the 
system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing 
from the grid that it is entirely likely another consumer will be 
drawing less to make up the difference. This “averaging” works 
in a similar fashion on the supply side of the grid. Individual 
wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply.18 So 
when the wind is not blowing through one wind farm, it is likely 
blowing harder through another. 
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals 
that of a single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds 
or thousands of turbines have even greater reliability because it 
is unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time. Fur-
thermore, when turbines do malfunction, they take far less time 
to recover than massive conventional power plants or nuclear 
reactors that have literally millions of individual components, 
arranged in complex circuits prone to mechanical failure.19 Ana-
lysts already confirmed the benefit of wind power’s greater tech-
nical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006 
study assessing the widespread use of wind power in Minnesota 
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concluded that “wind generation does make a calculable con-
tribution to system reliability” by decreasing the risk of large, 
unexpected outages.20 
Improved reliability of supply is important, as blackouts and 
brownouts exact a considerable toll on the American economy. 
The U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) estimates that while 
power interruptions often last only seconds or minutes, they cost 
consumers an average of $150 to 400 billion every year.21 The 
Electric Power Research Institute projects the annual costs of 
poor power reliability at $119 billion, or forty-four percent of all 
electricity sales in 1995.22
However, to capture such benefits, renewable energy tech-
nologies must be spatially deployed in every state and must have 
national penetration rates above ten percent. Penetration rates of 
renewable energy technologies nationwide are still low—around 
three percent of overall installed electricity capacity in 2007. 
Collective state efforts are expected to increase this amount to 
only around four percent by 2015 and five percent by 2030, but 
the environmental benefits of renewable energy only really start 
to accrue at penetration rates well above this rate. Federal inter-
vention in the form of a nation-wide SBC or RPS aiming for tar-
gets of ten to twenty percent by 
2020 would expand the diversity 
of technologies used to access 
renewable resources. 
improvinG enerGy  
Security
Second, larger penetration 
rates are needed to ensure energy 
security. This is because the 
geographical dispersion of gen-
erators not only improves their 
overall reliability; it makes them 
more secure—and thus resilient 
to accidental power outages and 
failure, or intentional attack and disruption. Notwithstanding 
intense media focus on the security dangers from nuclear reac-
tors and natural gas facilities, the nation’s power grid represents 
an equally serious threat to energy security. The security issues 
facing the modern electric utility grid are almost as serious as 
they are invisible. 
For example, in 1975 the New World Liberation Front 
bombed assets of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company more 
than ten times, and members of the Ku Klux Klan and San 
Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack elec-
tricity infrastructure.23 Internationally, organized paramilitaries 
such as the Farabundo-Marti National Liberation Front were 
able to interrupt more than ninety percent of electric service in El 
Salvador and even had manuals for attacking power systems.24 
Some caution that all it would take to cause a “cascade of 
power failures across the country,” costing billions of dollars in 
direct and indirect damage, is a few motivated people with mini-
vans and a couple of mortars and balloons, which they would 
use to chaff substations and disrupt transmission lines.25 A delib-
erate, aggressive, well-coordinated assault on the electric power 
grid could devastate the electricity sector. Replacement time 
would be “on the order of Iraq,” not “on the order of a lineman 
putting things up a pole.”26 
Several recent trends in the electric utility industry have 
increased the vulnerability of its infrastructure. To improve their 
operational efficiency, many utilities and system operators have 
increased their reliance on automation and computerization. 
Low margins and various competitive priorities have encour-
aged industry consolidation, with fewer and bigger facilities and 
intensive use of assets in one place. As the National Research 
Council noted, “control is more centralized, spare parts inven-
tories have been reduced, and subsystems are highly integrated 
across the entire business.”27
Federal promotion of renewable energy on a national scale 
can improve the security of the grid by decentralizing electric-
ity generation. Even when renewable resources like wind and 
solar are concentrated, the tendency for them to produce power 
in incremental and modular amounts makes it much more dif-
ficult to disrupt large segments of generation. The International 
Energy Agency has noted that centralized energy facilities create 
significant targets for terrorism because attacking a few facilities 
can cause large power outages.28 
In contrast to the security risks 
of large centralized generators, 
decentralizing energy facilities 
and providing power through 
more modular and distributed 
energy systems minimizes the 
risk of accidents and grid fail-
ures, and does not require trans-
porting or storing hazardous or 
radioactive materials. Analysts 
have tended to refer to renew-
able energy systems (and other 
forms of distributed generation 
such as fuel cells and small-scale cogeneration units) as “supple” 
power technologies because they are modular suited to dispersed 
siting.29 A national RPS or SBC promoting renewables could 
greatly contribute to the overall security of the nation’s electric 
infrastructure by forcing more technologies into the portfolio of 
all American utilities. 
proviDinG climate benefitS
Third, and perhaps most important, federal intervention is 
needed to fight climate change and minimize “free-riding” going 
on in states that have chosen to rely on nuclear and fossil fuels 
to generate electricity, instead of promoting renewable energy. 
The DOE has already determined that only “the imposition of [a 
national] RPS would lead to lower generation from natural gas 
and coal facilities.”30 Examinations of fuel generation in several 
states confirm this finding, as well as the tendency for a national 
RPS to displace oil-fired generation, which is still a significant 
source of electricity in Florida, New York, and Hawaii. Equally 
important, but often overlooked, is how SBC- or RPS-induced 
renewable generation would offset nuclear power in several 
regions of the United States. 
A deliberate, aggressive, 
well-coordinated assault 
on the electric power grid 
could devastate the  
electricity sector.
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Researchers in North Carolina, for example, determined 
that a state-wide RPS would displace facilities relying on 
nuclear fuels and minimize the environmental impacts associ-
ated with the extraction of uranium used to fuel nuclear reac-
tors.31 In Oregon, the Governor’s Renewable Energy Working 
Group analyzed a twenty-five percent statewide RPS by 2025 
and projected that every fifty MW of renewable energy would 
displace approximately twenty MW of base-load resources, 
including nuclear power.32 Environment Michigan estimates that 
a twenty percent RPS by 2020 would displace the need for more 
than 640 MW of power that would have otherwise come from 
both nuclear and coal facilities.33 
By offsetting the generation of conventional and nuclear 
power plants, only large-scale renewable energy penetration 
rates would avoid many of the environmental and social costs 
associated with the mining, processing, transportation, com-
bustion, and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels. By promot-
ing technologies that displace conventional forms of electricity 
generation, federal promotion of renewable energy would sub-
stantially decrease air pollution in the United States. A single one 
MW wind turbine running at only thirty percent of capacity for 
one year displaces more than 1,500 tons of carbon dioxide, 2.5 
tons of sulfur dioxide 3.2 tons of 
nitrous oxides, and 60 pounds of 
toxic mercury emissions.34 
One study assessing the 
environmental potential of a 580 
MW wind farm located on the 
Altamont Pass near San Fran-
cisco, California, concluded that 
the turbines displaced hundreds 
of thousands of tons of air pol-
lutants each year that would 
have otherwise resulted from 
fossil fuel combustion. 35 The study estimated that the wind farm 
would displace more than twenty-four billion pounds of nitrous 
oxides, sulfur dioxides, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide 
over the course of its twenty-year lifetime—enough to cover 
the entire city of Oakland, California in a pile of toxic pollution 
forty-stories high.36
Renewable energy technologies possess an even greater abil-
ity to mitigate climate change. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emis-
sions are included, coal plants are around ten times more carbon 
intensive than solar technologies and more than forty times more 
carbon intensive than wind technologies. Natural gas fares little 
better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and twenty times 
as carbon intensive as wind.37 The Common Purpose Institute esti-
mates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as 
0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of gen-
eration. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, a twenty percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by 434 million metric tons by 2020—a reduction of 
fifteen percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent 
to taking nearly seventy-one million automobiles off the road.38 
FIGure 2: DIrecT anD InDIrecT carbon emIssIons  
by elecTrIcITy TechnoloGy  
(equIvalenT Grams oF co
2
/kwh) 39
These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991 
and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands 
reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO
2
 between 4.4 
million and 6.7 million tons. Renewable technologies were so 
successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe 
now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution 
utilities in meeting industry CO
2
 reduction targets.”40 
conclusIon
Given such obvious and 
overwhelming advantages, it is 
hard to believe that many utili-
ties and policymakers diligently 
oppose national promotion 
on renewable energy, repeating 
myths that have long since been 
debunked. Largely, the remain-
ing objections to federal inter-
vention constitute a diminishing 
series of canards that mischarac-
terize a national SBC or RPS as an unnecessary federal inter-
vention in a relatively free market. Forgetting that a majority of 
states are well on their way to imposing their own clunky, over-
lapping, inconsistent, competing, and sometimes irrational mess 
of mandates, opponents churn out four war-torn myths every 
time the issue is considered:
The first criticism is that a national SBC or RPS would cre-
ate “winners and losers.” In reality, all states have renewable 
resources they can affordably develop. However, under the 
current system of state mandates, some states are “losers” by 
subsidizing the cheap, polluting electricity in other states. Other 
states are victims to inconsistencies between state mandates that 
produce perverse predatory trade-offs and require them to export 
their cheap in-state renewable electricity in exchange for more 
expensive electricity or renewable energy credits. A national 
mandate would level the playing field by creating consistent, 
uniform rules and by allowing utilities to purchase renewable 
energy credits or develop renewable resources anywhere they 
are cost competitive.
The second criticism is that a national mandate would 
increase electricity rates. However, in most states, renewable 
An RPS program transfers 
the risk of renewable  
energy investments from 
regulators to investors.
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energy mandates have not significantly increased rates and a 
consensus of economic models predict that a national policy 
would generate substantial consumer savings over the existing 
patchwork of state programs. By expanding the amount of 
energy that would offset gas-fired generation, a federal inter-
vention would reduce demand on a strained and volatile natural 
gas market. Renewable energy units with markedly faster lead-
times than conventional and nuclear reactors speeds the cost 
recovery of critical transmission investments and reduces the 
rate increases needed to pay for new transmission.
Another common criticism is that a federal mandate would 
harm the utilities sector in the form of future profits they will 
not be able to recover from consumers through higher electricity 
rates. For policymakers, balancing utility profits with electric-
ity prices is one of the hard decisions we elect them to make. 
However, elected officials should consider that utility claims of 
lost profit are short-sited and strategically unsound. In reality, a 
more predictable regulatory environment decreases utility litiga-
tion and compliance costs relative to a growing tangle of vague 
and unstable state mandates. Expanding the universe of eligible 
renewable resources and establishing clear, uniform trading rules 
creates far more flexibility for regulated utilities and rewards 
utility investments on the basis of smart market strategy. By 
promoting a robust domestic renewable energy manufacturing 
sector, a national mandate reduces the costs utilities pay in unfa-
vorable exchange rates for foreign parts and labor and redirects 
those investments to the U.S. labor market.
A final criticism is that a national RPS or SBC would pro-
mote only least-cost options such as wind turbines and land-
fill gas generators (and not solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, 
small-scale hydroelectric, and geothermal plants). Existing state 
programs, however, reveal that mandates with broad qualify-
ing resource eligibility actually have led to the development of 
many different renewable resources. Utilities have already dem-
onstrated that they can meet state requirements by deploying a 
diverse portfolio of renewable resources that best match their 
service areas. By geographically and monetarily expanding the 
market for renewable resources, a national RPS is likely to fur-
ther diversify the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
In Nevada, geothermal energy may be cheaper to develop than 
wind. In the Pacific Northwest, incremental hydroelectric power 
may be cheaper than solar. In the Southeast, biomass may be the 
most affordable. A national RPS mandate with a fuel-based defi-
nition of eligible renewable resources ensures that free market 
principles, rather than regulatory set-asides or political patron-
age, determine which technologies will be most cost competitive 
in certain areas of the country. An added bonus is that a national 
RPS decreases compliance costs for regulated utilities, since a 
technology-neutral mandate allows utilities to meet RPS obliga-
tions using the technology that is most cost competitive for the 
fuels available.
Ultimately, by establishing a consistent, national mandate 
and uniform trading rules, a national SBC or RPS can create a 
more just and predictable regulatory environment for utilities 
while jump-starting a robust national renewable energy technol-
ogy sector. By offsetting electricity that utilities would other-
wise generate with conventional and nuclear power, a federal 
action would decrease electricity prices for American consumers 
while protecting human health and the environment at a scale 
and magnitude not possible with state programs.
1 Press Release, Harvard School of Public Health, Impact of Pollution on Public 
Health (Jan. 3, 2001), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/
press01032001.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).  
2 Rodney Sobin, Energy Myth Seven: Renewable Energy Systems Could Never 
Meet Growing Electricity Demand in America, in enerGy anD american Soci-
ety—thirteen mythS 171, 171-99 (B.K. Sovacool & M.A. Brown eds., 2007).
3 navin nayak, reDirectinG america’S enerGy: the economic anD conSumer 
benefitS of clean enerGy policieS 11 (U.S. PIRG Education Fund, ed., 2005), 
available at http://www.uspirg.org/uploads/LQ/zu/LQzu1uCusnY9a02cMKw 
V0Q/redirectingamericasenergy.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
4 C. Levesque, RenewableEnergyAccess.com, What Is the Percentage of Fed-
eral Subsidies Allotted for Wind Power? (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.renewableenergyaccess.com/rea/news/story?id=48070 (last visited Oct. 
17, 2007).
5 Mark Bolinger, Ryan Wiser & Garrett Fitzgerald, An Overview of Investments 
by State Renewable Energy Funds in Large-Scale Renewable Generation Proj-
ects, the elec. J., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 78, 78-84; Brent Haddad & Paul Jefferiss, 
Forging Consensus on National Renewables Policy: The Renewables Portfolio 
Standard and the National Public Benefits Trust Fund, the elec. J., Mar. 1999, 
at 68, 70.
6 Ryan H. Wiser, State Policy Update: A Review of Effective Wind Power 
Incentives slide 5, 24 (Presentation to the Midwestern Wind Policy Institute 
Endnotes: State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy
June 15, 2007) http://www.ncsl.org/print/energy/SPRWiserWind07.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
7 For example Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, DSM 
Tariffs UE-941375 and UE-941377, Olympia, WA, 1994, and FERC, “Pro-
moting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket Nos. RM95-8-000 and 
RM94-7-001, Washington, DC, 1995, available at  http://dsd.lbl.gov/~johnston/
EDM/RM95-8.00.FERC.NOPRA.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
8 See Assemb. B. 1890, 1995–1996 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) art. 7.  
9 California Energy Commission, PIER Program (Public Interest Energy Pro-
gram) http://www.energy.ca.gov/pier/  (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
10 Clean Energy States Alliance, Home, http://www.cleanenergystates.org/
index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
11 Jacob Lemming, Financial Risk for Green Electricity Investors and Produc-
ers in a Tradable Green Certificate Market, 31 enerGy pol’y 21, 24 (2003).
12 Mark Jaccard, Renewable Portfolio Standard, 5 encyclopeDia of enerGy 413, 
413-21 (2004).
Endnotes: State Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy 
continued on page 78
78Fall 2007
enDnoTes: State effortS to promote renewable enerGy continued from page 9
13 Volkmar Lauber, REFIT and RPS: Options for a Harmonized Community 
Framework, 32 enerGy pol’y, 1405, 1405-14 (2004).
14 Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Prac-
tical Guide (Feb. 2001) (prepared for the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners), available at http://www.hemplinglaw.com/articles/
RPS%20FINAL.PDF (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
15 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Information Resources: States with Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/
renewable_portfolio_states.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2007). 
16 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, id.
17 Wiser, supra note 6.
18 int’l enerGy aGency, variability of winD power anD other renewableS: 
manaGement optionS anD StrateGieS at 20 (2005), available at http://www.iea.
org/Textbase/Papers/2005/variability.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
19 int’l enerGy aGency, id. 
20 enernex corporation & the miDweSt inDepenDent SyStem operator, final 
report—2006 minneSota winD inteGration StuDy (2006), available at http://
www.puc.state.mn.us/docs/windrpt_vol%201.pdf  (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
21 Shiva Swaminathan & Rajat K. Sen, review of power quality applicationS 
of enerGy StoraGe SyStemS. (Sandia National Laboratories 1998), available at 
http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/1998/981513.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
22 primen. electric power reSearch inStitute, inc. the coSt of power DiStur-
banceS to inDuStrial & DiGital economy companieS. report. no. TR-1006274 
(Primen. 2001), available at http://www.epri-intelligrid.com/intelligrid/docs/
Cost_of_Power_Disturbances_to_Industrial_and_Digital_Technology_ 
Companies.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
23 Alexander Farrell, Hisham Zerriffi & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Energy Infrastruc-
ture and Security, 29 ann. rev. of env’t. & reSourceS 421, 421-22 (2004).
24 Farrell, id.
25 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Rise of Complex Terrorism, foreiGn pol’y,  
Jan./Feb. 2002, at 34, 34-41. 
26 B.K. Sovacool, The Power Production Paradox: Revealing the Socio-Techni-
cal Impediments to Distributed Generation Technologies. Blacksburg: Virginia 
Tech, Doctoral Dissertation, Apr. 17, 2006.
27 committee on Sci. anD tech. for counterinG terroriSm, nat’l reSearch 
council, makinG the nation Safer: the role of Science anD technoloGy in 
counterinG terroriSm 178 (National Academies Press 2002).
28 int’l enerGy aGency. DiStributeD Generation in liberalizeD electric-
ity marketS at 48  (2002), available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/
free/2000/distributed2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
29 Alexander Farrell, Hisham Zerriffi & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Energy Infrastruc-
ture and Security, 29 ann. rev. of env’t. & reSourceS 421, 438 (2004).
30 u.S. Dep’t of enerGy info. aDmin., impactS of a 10-percent renewable 
portfolio StanDarD (Feb., 2002), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ 
FTPROOT/service/sroiaf(2002)03.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
31 Jonathan Winer, Mon-Fen Hong & Dick Spellman, Renewable Portfolio 
Standard: Analysis for the State of North Carolina (Mar. 8, 2007).
32 Governor’s Renewable Energy Working Group, Considerations regarding a 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) Framework for the State of Oregon slide 
14 (July 11, 2006) available at http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/RENEW/
docs/Utility_REWG_presentation_71106.ppt#256,1, (last visited Oct. 17, 
2007).
33 Mike Shriberg, Clean Energy Testimony, Hearing Before the Michigan 
State Senate Tech. & Energy Comm., (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.
environmentmichigan.org/testimony/new-energy-future/new-energy-future-
testimony/renewable-portfolio-standards (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).  
34 Ari Reeves & Fredric Becker, renewable enerGy policy proJect, winD 
enerGy for electric power: a reep iSSue brief (July 2003), available at 
http://www.repp.org/articles/static/1/binaries/wind%20issue%20brief_FINAL.
pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).  
35 Power Works, Pacific Winds, The Health Benefits of Altamont Pass Wind 
Power (2005) available at http://www.powerworksinc.com/healthbenefits.asp 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
36 Power Works, id. 
37 J. Spadaro, L. Langlois & B. Hamilton, Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Elec-
tricity Generation Chains—Assessing the Difference, in IAEA bulletin 42 
(2000), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/
Bull422/article4.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
38 Union of Concerned Scientists, Clean Energy Blueprint: A Smarter National 
Energy Policy for Today and the Future, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/
renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=44 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
39 Modified from Malcolm Griston, available at http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmenvaud/584/584we67.gif (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2007).
40 Neil Strachan & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Distributed Generation and Distribution 
Utilities, 30 enerGy pol’y 649, 660 (2002).
1 PewClimate.org, Reporting and Crediting System for Greenhouse Gases, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/states.cfm?ID=39 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
2 Reporting and Crediting System for Greenhouse Gases, id.
3 See PewClimate.org, Search Case Studies Database, http://pewclimate.org/
states.cfm (last visited Nov. 1) (listing California, Colorado, Idaho, and Oregon 
using search term “adder”). The number of utilities to whom the carbon adder 
applies varies. Id.
4 PewCenter.org, Oregon Carbon Adder, http://www.pewclimate.org/states.
cfm?ID=57 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
5 Oregon Carbon Adder, id.
enDnoTes: tranSlatinG State experience into feDeral climate policy continued from page 12
6 PewCenter.org, California PUC Carbon Adder, http://www.pewclimate.org/
states.cfm?ID=54 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
7 PewCenter.org, Colorado Carbon Adder, http://www.pewclimate.org/states.
cfm?ID=56 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
8 worlD reSourceS inStitute, climate policy in the State laboratory 6 
(Aug. 2006), available at http://pdf.wri.org/climate_policy_in_the_state_ 
laboratory.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).
9 worlD reSourceS inStitute, id. at 11-12. 
10 worlD reSourceS inStitute, id. at 21.
1 See Daniel Cusick, Bechtel Wins TVA Contract For $2.5B Watts Bar 
Reactor, e&e newS, Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/2007/10/15/4/#4 (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
2 See Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Reactor Oversight Process: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on 
Env’t and Pub. Works, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of David A. Lochbaum, 
Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists) [hereinafter 
UCS Testimony] (finding that “since 1966, there have been fifty-one (51) out-
ages lasting one year or longer at U.S. nuclear power reactors”).
enDnoTes: nuclear power continued from page 18
3 E.g., id. (noting that the NRC intentionally ignored a breach of federal regula-
tions prohibiting the unmonitored and uncontrolled release of radioactive air or 
liquid to the environment at Braidwood nuclear plant in Illinois from 1996 to 
2005).
4 See, e.g., Examiner.com, Sleeping Guards At Peach Bottom Prompt Investiga-
tion, (Oct. 5, 2007), available at http://www.examiner.com/a-972905~ 
Sleeping_guards_at_Peach_Bottom_prompt_investigation.html (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2007).
